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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Despite rapid economic growth the numbers living in absolute poverty in 
Africa have grown. The absence of inclusive growth can be traced to the 
structure of globalisation, the advance of financialisation and the trajectory of 
technological progress. A number of disruptive forces in which China has 
played a major role offer the possibility of moving from this exclusive growth 
strategy – terms of trade reversal, shifting markets and new paradigms of 
innovation. By providing cheap consumer and capital goods, new market 
opportunities and new more appropriate technologies, China has the capacity 
to help Africa move to a more sustainable growth path. However, this is not an 
inevitable outcome, and outcomes will also be contextual. The extent to which 
Africa is able to take advantage of opportunities opened up by China to move 
to a new more inclusive growth path will largely be determined by political 
factors, but these, too, are not independent of China’s increasing economic 
and political footprint, both globally and in its direct relations with Africa. 
 
 
1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
It is only recently that the “impact” of China’s growing economy has been 
recognised in Africa (hereafter, I will refer to sub-Saharan Africa, SSA). A 
personal anecdote reflects this belated recognition well. In March 2006 I 
entered into discussions with the African Economic Research Consortium 
regarding a programme of research on “The Impact of China on SSA”. The 
initial response of two of Africa’s most senior economists was that Africa’s 
problems were more to do with an overweaning regional economy (South 
Africa) than China,1 and if an Asian economy was an issue, it was India rather 
than China which came to mind. Five years down the road, and 22 country-
studies later (http://www.aercafrica.org/publications/category.asp), no serious 
observer holds the illusion either that China’s “impact” on Africa is 
inconsequential or that India is playing a larger role on the continent than 
China. 
 
It is not uncommon for research to lag unfolding events. But the speed and 
significance of China’s large and growing presence in SSA, coupled with the 
large indirect “impact” arising from China’s growing global presence 
represents a particularly marked example of the laggard nature of academic 
research. This research gap is marked by deficiencies both with regard to the 
empirics of China’s presence in SSA and in the theorising of the cause, nature 
and significance of its “impact” on the SSA economy. In this paper I propose 
to focus on what I observe to be a particularly neglected topic, that is the 
consequences of China’s growing presence on the distributional outcomes of 
growth in SSA. I am acutely aware of my disciplinary shortcomings in this 
discussion. As an economist I will be focusing on patterns of exchange and 
resource allocation. But the trajectory of growth in general and the 
distributional nature of growth in particular reflect relations of power. To some 
extent I will address this by opening the portmanteau categories of “China” 
and “Africa”, but I will have little to say about broader issues of political 
economy, regional hegemony or international relations. Other contributions in 
this workshop will speak more directly to these issues of political economy. As 
a final related caveat, the work of my colleagues Giles Mohan and Ben 
Lampert has helped me to understand the folly of addressing these issues as 
“the impact of China on SSA”. Their work shows that China’s growing role in 
SSA reflects the agency of African actors as well as those of Chinese actors 
(Mohan et al, 2011). As in the critique of the dependency literature in the 
1970s (Leys, 1994), it is important that this discussion of evolving political 
economy does not relegate African actors to passive recipients of the 
predatory actions of others. (Having made this important observation, the 
ensuing discussion now follows common practice, and lapses into disciplinary 
reductionism by dropping the inverted commas accompanying “impact”).    
 
The dominant discourse on China’s impact on SSA addresses the 
consequences of direct bilateral relations between China and individual 
economies (see for example, the AERC’s 22 country-studies). However, in 
many cases the major impacts arise not so much from direct relations but 
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from indirect factors. The large footprint of the Chinese economy means that 
the small-country assumption no longer holds, and its growth trajectory affects 
the global political economy in numerous ways. These indirect global impacts 
often have a more profound impact on individual countries than those which 
arise as a consequence of direct relations with China (Kaplinsky, 2009). This 
is as true for the impact on distribution as it is for other factors. Consequently 
before discussing the potential impact of China on inclusive growth in Africa, it 
is necessary to begin with an understanding of four framing global 
developments which affect the nature of growth paths in SSA. The first is the 
distributional character of SSA’s recent growth-surge. The second is the  
disruptive impact of China on the terms of trade and hence on the evolving 
pattern of economic specialisation in SSA. The third is the accretion of 
technological capabilities in China and the character of its innovation 
trajectory. The fourth issue arises as a consequence of the shift in final 
markets from the north to the south as the global economy enters a period of 
structural crisis. In each case we address the particular contribution which 
China makes to these developments. 
 
 
2. SETTING THE SCENE: FOUR RELEVANT GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS 
 
Poverty-inducing growth 
The data in Table 1 tells a compelling story. The first decade of the twenty-
first century witnessed an acceleration of growth in many low and middle 
income countries. These rates were high by comparison with the last decade 
of the twentieth century (and even more so in comparison to the lost 
development decades of the 1980s), and by comparison with global average 
growth rates in the same periods. Rapid and accelerating growth was most 
pronounced in China and India, but was also evidenced in middle income 
countries as a whole, as well as in SSA. At the same time, the numbers living 
globally below the MDG1 $1.25pd benchmark fell by 339m between 1998-
1990 and 2007-2008. This is often taken to indicates progress in global 
poverty reduction. Yet, the decline in the poverty number in China (516m) 
exceeded the global total (339m), which means that outside of China, the 
number living globally below MDG1 increased by 177m. In SSA, a more than 
doubling of the annual average growth rate resulted in a 59 percent increase 
in absolute poverty numbers. In India, the recent “growth miracle” has been 
associated with a further 42m people living below MDG1. Strikingly, despite 
rapid economic growth, there was a more than doubling of the number of  the 
absolutely poor in middle income countries and currently, more than 70 
percent of those living below MDG1 live in this rapidly growing group of 
economies.2 
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Table 1: GDP Growth Rates and Numbers Living Below MDG1, 1990-2008 
 
 GDP growth p.a (%) Living below $1.25 per 
day (MDG1) 
($2005PPP) 
  1990-2000 2000-2008 1988-90 2007-2008 
World 2.9 3.1 1,668 1,329 
China 9.9 10.4 724 208 
India 5.5 7.0 414 456 
SSA 2.2 4.9 224 355 
Source: Poverty numbers from Chen and Ravallion (2008) and Sumner 
(2010). Growth rates from WDI, accessed October 2011 
 
What these numbers point to is the structural character of the dominant 
growth model in which, in many countries, a significant proportion of the 
population is being excluded from the fruits of growth. This impoverished 
population is made up of two groups. The first are those living in Lewis’s 
traditional sector, eking out a living in subsistence agriculture or in low-paid 
formal-sector employment. The second are the truly-marginalised, those living 
without access to land or formal-sector employment. As Davies points out, the 
global poor increasingly live in sprawling urban slums, where much of the 
landless population is unemployed (Davies, 2004).3 This bifurcated structure 
between the haves and the have-nots shows superficial similarities with 
Lewis’ two-sector model. However, his “traditional sector” had means of 
subsistence (Lewis, 1954). To this we now need to add a rapidly growing 
“third sector” – that of the wholly excluded, without either access to land or 
employment. 
 
There are three primary and related factors which explain this structural 
character of the current dominant global growth trajectory. The first is that it 
arises as a direct result of deepening globalisation (Kaplinsky, 2005). 
Globalisation allows high income earners who possess various forms of rent 
(such as natural resources, skills, entrepreneurship and patents) to valorise 
these rents over a larger market. At the same time it exposes those with low 
incomes and without rents to intensified competition. For example in the case 
of unskilled labour, the global labour pool has doubled in the past two 
decades, following the entry of China, India and the former Soviet Union into 
the global economy. China’s success in reducing absolute poverty in the 
context of its rapid outward oriented growth and deepening participation in the 
global economy is often used to argue that the dominant globalisation growth 
model is in fact poverty-reducing. However, this focus on the success of 
China ignores the impact of its growth on other economies. Chinese 
competitiveness in third-country markets places pricing pressures on the 
exports of other economies (Kaplinsky and Santos-Paulino, 2006; Fu, 
Kaplinsky and Zhang, 2009; Wood and Meyer 2011)) and displaces low 
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income economy exports from these markets (Kaplinsky, McCormick and 
Morris, 2010). Its exports also undermine domestically oriented manufacturing 
in other low income economies.  
 
The second factor explaining the distributional character of this global growth 
trajectory is the financialisation of the global economy (Lazonik, 2010). This 
has placed a growing emphasis on high-income yielding arbitrage rather than 
production, with this arbitrage being a function confined largely to the high-
income economies and to the capital cities of a selected few middle income 
countries. It has led to change in the terms of trade between producers of 
goods and non-financial services, and those operating in the financial services 
sector, shifting distributional patterns in favour of the financial sector. It has 
also led to, and is likely to continue to lead to growing volatility of incomes 
throughout the global economy. For example, the financial crisis of 2008 
temporarily pushed almost 100 million Indonesians into absolute poverty. 
Outside from the fact that China’s savings have essentially funded 
generalised overconsumption in much of the north and has thus allowed this 
structurally unsustainable growth-path to endure, China is perhaps more a 
victim than a perpetrator of the growing financialisation of the global economy. 
 
The third factor which explains why enhanced growth co-exists with, and 
indeed in some cases causes absolute poverty arises from the dominant 
trajectory of innovation. Its capital-intensive nature, its scale intensity, its 
dependence on high-quality networked infrastructure, its reliance on skilled 
labour and its product portfolio (producing products which meet the needs of 
the rich) all have the effect of disadvantaging the poor, both as consumers 
and producers, and of excluding large segments of the population in many 
countries from productive employment.4 Moreover, much contemporary 
technology is also destructive of the environment, not least in relation to its 
energy-intensity, and this has disproportionately negative impacts on the 
global poor. Whilst innovation is only a partial contributor to the persistence of 
global poverty it is an important one, and one which is largely neglected in the 
theorisation of innovation (Cozzens and Kaplinsky, 2009). Hitherto, China has 
played little role as a source of innovation, but as we will see below, this is 
beginning to change and with potentially significant implications for inclusive 
growth in low income economies. 
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Terms of trade reversal5 
Until the early twenty-first century, and since at least the 1920s, and probably 
for a century before that, the terms of trade have moved in favour of 
manufactures and against natural resources. There were two small blips in 
this long-run trend – in the early 1950s and the early 1970s – but as a general 
rule the prices of manufactures rose faster (or, in deflationary periods fell 
more slowly) than those of commodities. There are a cluster for factors 
explaining this long-run historical trend, but two related explanations stand 
out. First, the  major markets were in high income economies and at high 
levels of per capita income, the commodities-intensity of growth and the price 
elasticity of demand for commodities decline. Second, barriers to entry (which 
define rents and hence incomes) were as a general rule high and increasing 
in the manufacturing sector and low and static in many of the commodities 
sectors. As a consequence, the primary form of rent-appropriation during this 
period of (commodities-manufactures) terms of trade decline was 
Schumpeterian rather than Ricardian in nature.  
 
But after the mid 1990s, these  primary determinants of demand and supply 
began to change. The very rapid growth of China – averaging around 10 
percent a year for more than three decades - occurred in the context of low 
per capita incomes, underdeveloped infrastructure and low levels of housing. 
Growth in all these areas of consumption is commodities intensive, and hence 
the growth-elasticity of demand for commodities changed as the primary pole 
of global growth moved from high-income to low- and middle-income 
economies. Related to this are changes in the elasticity of supply. In the case 
of manufactures, the rapid advance of global value chains in manufacturing 
has led to a reduction in the barriers to entry in manufacturing and China in 
particular has become the manufacturing centre of the world. This has been 
associated, particularly from the early 1990s until the mid noughties, with 
falling prices of manufactures in global markets. On the other side of the 
supply-coin, there are growing constraints to increasing supply in many 
commodities – in some cases due to the exhaustion of cheap deposits (as in 
energy), in other cases due to a combination of climate change and falling 
rates of technological change (as in soft commodities) and in other cases due 
to the environmental and political difficulties in exploiting new resources (as in 
the case of mining).  
 
As a consequence of these changes in the dynamics of demand and supply, 
the last decade has witnessed a period of terms of trade reversal. After 2002 
the prices of minerals and energy commodities rose sharply, and this was 
followed from 2006 by rising prices of soft commodities. At the same time, 
intense competition in the global market for manufactures meant that we have 
witnessed a reversal in the terms of trade in favour of commodities (Figure 1). 
The underlying determinant of demand and supply suggest that this terms of 
trade reversal will be sustained for some time, notwithstanding the likely 
temporary downward blip as the global economy dips in and out of financial 
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crises.6 In both cases, China has played a key role (Farooki and Kaplinsky, 
2012). 
 
Figure 1: The commodities-manufactures terms of trade (1949-2008) 
1949 1954 1959 1964 1969 1974 1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004
 
 
Farooki and Kaplinsky, 2012 
 
The global spread of innovative capabilities 
Recent decades have seen a substantial increase in the share of global 
manufacturing value added in low income countries in general, and in China 
in particular. The global diffusion of manufacturing value added has been 
associated with a pervasive increase in capabilities in many low-income 
economies. These capabilities have been built on a number of strands of 
activity. The first has been the relatively passive processes of learning-by-
doing, and the more active processes of “learning by adaptation” and 
“learning by capacity expansion” (Katz, 1987; Bell, 2007). These firm- and 
farm-level activities – generally associated with efforts to make maximum use 
of purchased, and often imported technologies – arise out of incremental 
changes undertaken in the operation of equipment. They are often also 
acquired through participation in global value chains (Kaplinsky and Morris, 
2001; Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon, 2005). Formally-constituted R&D is 
another important component of innovation (although often overestimated in 
importance), By 2000, more than one-fifth of global R&D was located in the 
developing world (Hollanders and Soete, 2010), an increase of major 
significance given the estimated share in 1970 of only 2 percent (Singer et al, 
1970). An increasing share of this dispersed R&D occurs as a result of 
outsourcing by global TNCs, particularly to China and India (Bruche, 2009).  
 
The recognition of China’s growing innovation capabilities generally focuses 
on companies such as Huawei (currently the worlds second largest telecoms 
company), Haier (the world’s second largest white goods producer) and 
COSCO (dominant in the global container trade) (Zeng and Williamson, 
                                            
6
  Because of the financialisation of commodity markets, their prices are likely to be 
more volatile than those of manufactures,  
7 
2007). But below the radar is a thrust of  technological progress of a very 
different sort. Spurred by demand from low income consumers (see the 
following section), low labour prices and often poor infrastructure, China is 
becoming a source of appropriate technology, that is, appropriate for the 
operating conditions of low income economies. But unlike previous vintages of 
appropriate technology which were diffused by NGOs and were often 
inefficient, this new generation of appropriate technologies coming out of 
China (as well as India, Brazil and other emerging economies) is a result of 
profit-seeking capitalist entrepreneurship (Kaplinsky, 2010d). There are many 
examples of these rapidly-diffusing technologies such as the motorbikes in 
Cameroon which sell at one-third of the Japanese competition and which 
have enabled youth to enter the economy as taxi-drivers and logistics 
providers, and the light-plus-phone-solar-charger in Kenya which retails for 
$39. 
 
Shifting markets 
Despite the revival of economic growth in the USA and other northern 
economies after the financial crisis of 2008, most of the high income markets 
continue to experience two structural deficits. The first is with regard to debt, 
where despite a narrowing of deficits in the private sector, sovereign debt 
remains high and continues to grow. The second, less widely recognised but 
equally germane to our discussion, is the level and persistence of balance of 
payments deficits. The structural rebalancing required to meet both of these 
deficits will necessarily lead to a decline in demand in high income markets, 
whether resulting from orderly or disorderly process of adjustment (Kaplinsky 
and Farooki, 2011). Increasingly, and with some irony, observers refer to the 
likelihood of a “lost decade” in the US and parts of Europe, mirroring the 
experience of Latin America and Africa in the 1980s and of Japan in the 
1990s. By contrast, China, India, Brazil and other emerging economies seem 
unlikely to suffer from the same growth trauma, and growth in these low 
income economies is likely to remain high and robust, at least by comparison 
with the northern economies. The Africa-Asia-Central Europe head of Unilever 
estimated in 2010 for example that, by 2020, nearly 80 percent of incremental 
consumption growth will come from emerging economies. 
 
These growing low income economy markets are distinctive. On the one 
hand, they reflect a rapid growth in demand by an urban middle class which is 
not very different from most consumer markets in the north, searching for 
globally-branded, differentiated and high-quality positional goods. For 
example, in 2010 the most rapidly-growing market for Mercedes Benz and 
Rolls Royce cars was in China. But on the other hand, there is an expanding 
and very large market of poor consumers. In particular, in China there is a 
clustering of households with total household incomes of less than $5,000 in 
2009. In 2009 they comprised 56 percent of all households in China.7 
Critically, incomes in this category of income recipients is growing rapidly. 
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Figure 2: Number of households, by disposable income, China and 
India, 2004 and 2009 
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Source: Complied from  http://www.portal.euromonitor.com accessed July 
2010 
 
It is the driving of consumption by low income households which is inducing 
the new stream of below-the-radar appropriate technology discussed above. 
As McKinsey advises its clients, these innovations will be distinctively different 
from those produced for high income global consumers, somewhere between 
the positional goods of high income consumers and the basic functions and 
low acquisition cost goods of the very low income defined by Prahalad (2005) 
as those at the “bottom of the pyramid”. It is this “bottom of the pyramid” 
market which has begun to draw the attention of many of the world’s largest 
TNCs, particularly those selling final consumer goods such as Unilever, 
Proctor and Gamble and Nestles. Low income consumers may prefer “high 
quality” branded goods, but they lack the incomes required to both acquire 
and then consume these more expensive goods. In these circumstances they 
will make do with what they can afford, rather than what they would prefer to 
consume. 
 
A further important reflection of the changing geography of global 
consumption has been the shift of final market in many sectors from high 
income countries to low income countries. This has had important implications 
for the role of standards in global value chains. Products destined for high 
income consumers and countries have tended to involve the extensive use of 
both product and process standards. By comparison, products destined for 
low income markets have been relatively devoid of standards (Kaplinsky, 
Terheggen and Tijaja, 2011), removing some of the barriers to entry for small 
scale producers. However, insofar as these standards have protected the 
environment and the exploitation of vulnerable labour, there has been some 
trade-off between the various consequences of production processes and 
products which affect poor producers and consumers. 
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3. CHINA AND INCLUSIVE GROWTH IN SSA 
 
Gathering together the threads of the discussion in Section 2 above, outside 
of China we observe a widespread tendency for rapid growth to exclude a 
significant segment of the population from employment and other sources of 
income, particularly in SSA. Related to this, and unlike some countries in Latin 
America with social democrat governments redistributing income through 
increases in the social wage (Cornia, 2011), SSA has witnessed a marked 
rise in income inequality during these decades of deepening globalisation and 
rapid growth. Much of the explanation of this sorry distributional story arises 
as a consequence of China’s rapidly growing global economic footprint.8 Its 
prowess in manufacturing forecloses the opportunities for labour-intensive 
manufactured exports for most SSA economies, and creates enormous 
pressures for domestically-oriented industry. China’s abundance of cheap, 
experienced and skilled labour makes it (and the surrounding east-Asian 
production system) the favoured site for outsourcing in global value chains, 
again foreclosing the hopes of many that African labour will come to play a 
key role in global production networks in the foreseeable future. Moreover, 
whilst terms of trade reversal provides substantial resource rents for many 
SSA economies, many resource-sectors are not just highly capital-intensive 
(particularly oil and mining), but are susceptible to kleptocracy, hence 
embedding organised and anarchic corruption which not only undermines the 
legitimacy of governance but also promote civil wars. Insofar as the hard and 
energy commodity sectors employ labour, this is often disproportionately 
weighted in favour of expatriate skills and highly skilled locals, again excluding 
the poor from the fruits of production. 
 
It might be thought from this that China’s impact on growth in SSA is 
inherently exclusive in distributional terms, both as a direct consequence of 
bilateral links (for example, through the destruction of domestically-oriented 
industry by imports from China) and indirectly (for example, by foreclosing 
participation in third-country markets and as a result of capital-intensive 
resource investments). Indeed, as a generalisation, this negative perspective 
on the impact of China on SSA suffuses much of the literature which tends to 
focus on China-as-threat rather than China-as-opportunity. It is also a 
particularly northern-sourced view, since China’s impact on SSA is often seen 
through more favourable lens in Africa itself. Either way – whether seen as 
China-as-threat or China-as-opportunity - much of the discussion is crude and 
un-nuanced. In an attempt to deepen our understanding of these issues, I 
now address four factors where I believe there are signs that China’s growing 
presence in SSA may simultaneously also be promoting of less unequalising 
and less impoverishing outcomes 
 
Consumer welfare and cheap wage goods 
The impact of cheap Chinese imports in lowering the cost of living is well-
observed in northern economies, where it is widely recognised that falling 
prices of clothing, footwear and electronic goods were a major contributor to 
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subdued inflationary pressures after 1995, and particularly during the first 
decade of the noughties. A similar story can be told for many SSA economies, 
although the level of empirics to substantiate these observations is thin. One 
study undertaken in South Africa does however provide compelling evidence 
of the benefits to consumers in general, and to poor wage-earners in 
particular of cheap imports from China (Morris and Einhorn, 2008). It charts 
the dramatic growth of Chinese clothing imports into South Africa, growing 
from $223m in 2000 to $1,123m in 2006. China’s share of clothing imports 
(excluding those form Hong Kong) rose from 16.5 percent in 1995 to 78.8 
percent in 2005. As Morris and Einhorn observe, “[l]arge-scale imports of 
clothing from China had become the order of the day” (ibid: 363). Assessing 
the impact of these imports on different types of consumers, they observe a 
disproportionate decline in the prices of products purchased by low-income 
and middle-income consumers – high-income consumers were more design- 
and quality-, and less price-conscious. Using baby clothes as an indicator of a 
standardised low-income consumption basket (a choice informed by the retail 
industry’s knowledge of purchasing patterns) they record a more than fourfold 
increase in imports from China between 2002 and 2005. During the same 
period, as Table 2 shows, they record a substantial and sustained fall in unit 
clothing prices. These benefits arising from access to cheap imports are not 
confined to the consumption-welfare impact on the poor. They also have a 
growth-impact on other sectors since falling prices of wage goods reduce the 
costs of reproduction of the labour force and moderate wage pressures in 
other sectors. 
 
  
Source: Morris and Einhorn, 2008 
 
Of course, growing imports and falling import prices are not a story of 
unambiguous welfare gain, since they occur at the cost of labour previously 
employed in domestic industry who are displaced from the market. There are 
however very different estimates of the numbers of displaced workers. The 
South African trades unions claim a loss of almost 65,000 jobs in the clothing 
and textile sector between 2003 and 2006, but Morris and Edwards conclude 
that this is an overestimate, masking the informalisation of much employment, 
since in their recorded sample, the number of clothing workers employed in 
the formal sector declined by 26 percent (26,269 workers) between December 
2004 and December 2007, but the number of firms only fell by 11 percent in 
the same period (Edwards and Morris, 2007).. 
 
New markets 
The rapidly-growing onset of structural crisis in the north will undoubtedly also 
spill over into  the southern economies in general, including to China where 
the recent growth trajectory has been heavily reliant on exports to the north. 
Nevertheless, there is widespread agreement that whilst there might be a 
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slowdown in the Chinese economy, its rate of growth will remain positive and 
high, and will almost certainly involve an expansion of domestic demand and 
an increase in imports. But what types of imports will be involved? 
 
Insofar as China has been a major exporter of manufactures, the imports 
feeding with its export trajectory have often been of a high-tech nature, and 
although Chinese technological capabilities are growing rapidly, much of its 
manufacturing sector merely assembles imported components. For example, 
the export value of an iPhone assembled in China is $178.96. but the value 
actually added in China was only $6.50 (Xing and Dutert, 2010). This pattern 
of trade composition – high tech component imports to feed high-tech 
assembled products - reflects the nature of the final market into which 
Chinese producers where consumption is driven by high per capita incomes. 
With regard to the domestic market, on the one hand, there is a rapid growth 
in demand by an urban middle class which is not very different from most 
consumer markets in the north, searching for globally-branded, differentiated 
and high-quality positional goods. For example, in 2010 the most rapidly-
growing market for Mercedes Benz and Rolls Royce cars was in China. But 
on the other hand, there is a rapidly-expanding and very large market of poor 
consumers. In particular, as we saw above, there is a clustering of 
households with total household incomes of less than $5,000 in 2009, 
comprised 56 percent of all households in China in 2009  (Figure 3).  
 
The rapid growth of the Chinese domestic market will provide opportunities for 
SSA exporters, almost certainly greater opportunities than an equivalent 
growth in high income markets. But there are distinctive characteristics to the 
growth of demand in low income economies such as China. First, as we 
observed above (and as documented in Farooki and Kaplinsky, 2012), 
consumption growth in low income markets is particularly resource intensive, 
forcing SSA economies into resource-dependence. Without countervailing 
policies (see below), this resource dependence is unlikely to have significant 
spillovers to the poor and excluded populations in SSA. Second, the emerging 
evidence suggests that countries switching their markets from high-wage and 
environmentally-conscious northern economies to low-wage and less 
environmentally-aware low income countries experience a fall in the degree of 
value added to their exports (Kaplinsky, Terheggen and Tijaja, 2011). This is 
because low income importing countries have similar wage rates and 
environmental indifference to low income exporting economies, and seek to 
compete in those parts of the value chain which high income importing 
economies were happy to see undertaken abroad. And, third, consumers and 
governments in low income countries are less concerned about process and 
product standards such as child labour, rights-of-organisation and 
environmental standards. Insofar as standards have been a barrier to entry for 
poor producers and illiterate labour in global value chains, this provides more 
scope for small scale producers and unskilled labour. Fourth, low income 
consumers are less concerned with product quality, reducing the barriers to 
entry by relatively unsophisticated African producers. 
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Making the most commodities9 
As observed above, there are strong grounds for concluding that despite high 
volatility, the relative price of commodities will remain high for some years to 
come, and this arises in large part form the rapid growth of the Chinese 
economy. This provides resource exporting SSA economies with substantial 
potential resource rents. But as the resource curse literature points out, it is 
the way in which these rents are utilised which provides the potential for more 
inclusive growth paths. Here it is helpful to turn to one of the pioneers of 
development studies, Albert Hirschman. Hirschman, reflecting on spillovers 
from the resource sector in the post-war decades indentified three different 
types of linkages (Hirschman, 1981). The first are fiscal linkages, in which a 
share of resource rents are appropriated and diverted to the development of 
non-resource sectors of the economy. The second are consumption linkages 
in which incomes earned in the extraction and processing of linkages increase 
the demand for the output of domestic industry. The third type are production 
linkages, feeding inputs into the resource sector (backward linkages) and 
processing the output of the resource sector (forward linkages).10 
 
Applying this threefold distinction to the issue of inclusive growth, it is clear 
that governance and policy have a important roles to play in distributional 
outcomes. Hitherto the political economy of much of the resource sector in 
SSA has been such that it has acted to strengthen exclusion rather than to 
promote the upgrading of poor producers and the inclusion of the 
marginalised from the productive sector. But this is not the only possible 
outcome arising from the expanded resource rents generated by a sustained 
commodities price boom. It is possible to conceive of policies which provide 
for the development of linkages which favour poor producers, both in those 
sectors unrelated to commodities (fiscal and consumption linkages) and to 
those feeding directly into and out of the resource sector (Kaplinsky, 2011b). 
In particular, in the case of productive linkages, disproportionate policy 
attention has been given to forward linkages beneficiating the output of the 
resource sector, and there are unexploited opportunities available for the 
expansion of backward linkages (Morris, Kaplinsky and Kaplan, 2011c). In 
many cases, backward linkages are more labour intensive in nature (for 
example, catering, security, plastic pipes, machinery repair) than forward 
linkages (for example an aluminium smelter or petroleum refinery). However, 
as in the case of SSA’s past growth-trajectory, the development of linkages 
per se will not necessarily be promoting of a more inclusive growth path. This 
requires the adoption of a range of complementary policies, which in turn 
reflect wider issues of political economy (which in turn are not unrelated to the 
politics of resource extraction). These issues of political economy are similarly 
also affected by the particular approach adopted by China’s tolerance of 
repressive regimes, although it would be wise to recognise the likely 
dynamism of China’s links with SSA governments and elites. For example, 
when more Chinese workers are kidnapped or killed in African war zones, and 
when it is Chinese rather than northern firms whose assets are appropriated 
                                            
9
  The discussion in this section draws heavily from a recently competed collaborative 
research project undertaken by researchers in nine SSA economies – Morris, 
Kaplinsky and Kaplan, 2011a, 2011b, and 2011c) 
10
  These three sets of linkages are elaborated in Kaplinsky, 2011b. 
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(or misappropriated), it may well be the case that China’s position of “non-
interference” will change in the future. 
 
Entrepreneurship 
Whatever the ideology of policy – growth strategies, pro-poor growth 
strategies, green strategies, etc – the real driver of growth is likely to be naked 
capitalist greed,11 aided to varying degrees by a capital-friendly state. But 
capitalism has a variety of faces – the question is whether the forms it takes in 
particular environments is promoting or destroying of inclusivity. Leaving aside 
for the moment the extent to which a developmental state may use resource 
rents to promote fiscal linkages in other sectors which serve the needs of the 
poor and which incorporate the poor in value chains (as is argued to be the 
case in some Latin American economies – Cornia, 2011), the critical issue is 
therefore the nature of entrepreneurship in the productive sector as a whole. 
Here, as a general rule, small scale and distributed capital is more likely to be 
promoting of inclusive growth than large scale and centralised capital. This 
does not mean that small scale entrepreneurs are in some sense more 
benevolent than their large scale counterparts – to the contrary, they tend to 
pay lower wages and adopt less labour-friendly labour processes. But in 
general their production systems are more labour-intensive, they are more 
dispersed regionally, they are more tolerant of poor infrastructure and they 
tend to produce products for poorer consumers. 
 
China’s presence in SSA links to the dynamism of small scale 
entrepreneurship in two major ways. First, the capital goods and business 
systems emerging from China’s “below-the-radar” innovation system are 
particularly appropriate for small scale SSA entrepreneurs (Kaplinsky, 2011d). 
Beyond the cheap clothing documented above are a stream of 
(undocumented) capital goods which casual empiricism suggests are diffusing 
increasingly rapidly throughout SSA. The examples of cheap motorcycles and  
solar chargers have been mentioned above, but these are merely the tip of an 
iceberg which includes cheap (and easily repairable) tractors and other types 
of farm mechanisation equipment, packaging machinery, woodworking 
machinery, metalworking machinery and capital goods used in a wide variety 
of industries. These reduce the barriers to entry for small scale and distributed 
producers. 
 
Second, a weakly-recorded phenomenon but of considerable importance, is 
the rapid growth of a stream of informal Chinese “migrants” throughout 
the SSA economy. There are wildly different estimates of the numbers 
involved (ranging from 250,000 to well over one million) but fetishing numbers 
misses the point. Visits to rural areas or petty commodity and informal sector 
districts in almost every African country shows a rapidly growing presence of 
people of Chinese origin. My colleague Ben Lampert, who has worked for 
some years in West Africa, relates that whilst walking around predominantly 
low-income areas of Lagos, the obligatory salutation of ‘oyinbo’ [pronounced 
oyeebo] (=white man) have on recent visits come to be increasingly 
                                            
11
  The quest for “Schumpeterian rents” is currently the friendly face of this greed, 
elevated to virtue in previous centuries by Adam Smith 
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interspersed with calls of ‘Chinco’ or ‘Mr Wang’ (=Chinese man). These 
“migrants” are a vibrant source of SME growth which has two potential 
spinoffs in promoting  more inclusive growth – they provide employment to 
local labour, and they are important entrepreneurial role models. This latter 
phenomenon is particularly distinctive from the entrepreneurship associated 
with northern citizens, since whereas Chinese migrants often live and work in 
low income housing areas and in conditions similar to the indigenous 
population with whom they mingle (Mohan et. al;. 2011). European, North 
American, Middle Eastern and North Asian citizens tend to be based in high-
cost protected ghettoes. 
 
On the other hand, not all Chinese entrepreneurship displays these 
characteristics. Indeed, the pervasive received wisdom of Chinese enterprises 
in Africa is of large SOEs importing virtually all of their inputs from China and  
employing low-skilled, low-paid Chinese prison labour who live in barbed-wire 
compounds. There may be elements of truth in this story. For example, it is 
the case that the import content of many large scale SOE firms operating in 
infrastructure projects in countries such as Angola is high (Corkin, 2011). It is 
also the case that many of these large construction firms, and some of the 
Chinese mining firms such as those operating in Zambia’s copper sector, do 
employ large numbers of Chinese workers. Moreover, It is also often the case 
that by comparison with their northern counterparts they invest less heavily in  
supply chain development (although in Zambia they perform better than the 
Indian-owned mine – Fessehaie, 2011). But there is also a great deal of myth 
surrounding the character of large Chinese firms. I have not seen any 
documented cases of prison labour being employed in Chinese firms 
operations in SSA. In other cases, the employment of foreign nationals is not 
at the cost of indigenes, but due to a shortage of labour. The imported labour 
is of Asian origin, but to locals (and indeed northern journalists!), all Asian are 
classified as Chinese. Thus Mohan records that Chinese construction firms in 
Ghana employ Pakistani drivers, but these are spoken of as being Chinese 
(personal communication). In Gambia, timber firms of Malaysian origin are 
widely regarded as Chinese firms (Terheggen, 2010). Nevertheless it is also 
the case that Chinese firms in many of SSA’s resource sectors either do not 
source as much from local suppliers as do their northern counterparts, or 
when they do (as in Sudan’s oilfields) they bring their Chinese suppliers with 
them. It is likely that the seven Special Economic Zones (SEZs) currently 
under construction in Egypt, Ethiopia, Mauritius, Nigeria (two), Uganda and 
Zambia will be largely populated by Chinese owned firms (Morris, Kaplinsky 
and Kaplan, 2011b). 
 
 
4. CUI BONO? 
 
We are thus left with a complex picture. The distributional outcomes of growth 
are a combination of political and economic forces. In turn, the economic 
character of growth reflects a combination of technical factors (for example, 
scale, complexity and the factor-intensities of technology) and social and 
political factors. In these circumstances it is foolhardy to generalise about the 
impact of China’s presence in SSA in terms of its inclusivity and exclusivity. 
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The outcomes will always be contextual, and moreover inherently dynamic as 
a consequence of both developments endogenous to a host-country in SSA 
and to exogenous factors in China and elsewhere in the global economy.12 
 
Nevertheless, despite this need for a nuanced contextual analysis, we can 
point to a series of underlying influencing factors which arise from the 
character of China’s political economy and the speed of deepening global 
presence and which affect the inclusivity of growth paths in SSA. First, there 
is undoubtedly an important enhancement to the welfare of low income 
consumers arising out of the flooding into SSA of cheap consumer goods. 
Although this is often at the cost of domestic enterprises (as in the case of 
Ethiopia’s shoe industry (Egziabher, 2006) or South Africa’s more developed 
clothing sector (Edwards and Morris, 2007), in general the costs are felt by 
traditional northern exporters of these goods to SSA or of suppliers based in 
other low income economies (including South Africa which has been a 
growing exporter of manufactures into the region). 
 
Second, China’s thirst for natural resources has led to a historically-significant 
shift in the commodities-manufactures terms of trade. This indirect impact has 
important implications for the inclusivity of growth paths in Africa. In the hard 
and energy commodities sectors, which tend to be very capital intensive and 
open to kleptocracy, the overall impact is likely to be to reduce inclusivity 
unless the resource boom is managed by an efficient and redistributive state. 
In Latin American countries such as Brazil, resource rents have been used to 
increase the social wage, and in both Botswana and Namibia, the introduction 
of pensions has similarly been funded by resource rents. The same cannot be 
said for Gabon and most other SSA countries however. In the case of soft 
commodities, the likely long-term increase in food prices (Farooki and 
Kaplinsky, 2012) may provide the potential for rising farm incomes although in 
many respects rising commodity prices increasing costs and hence may lead 
to static and even perhaps falling incomes for farmers, including for low-
income small and medium sized farmers. 
 
Third, the growth of China’s domestic market, made up largely of low- and 
middle-income consumers, will create a demand for imported products, many 
of which can in principle be sourced from SSA. Hitherto, outside of the 
commodities sector, there is virtually no evidence that African producers have 
been able to take advantage of these opportunities, despite the introduction of 
trade preferences for African producers on 454 products (to be increased to 
almost 5,000 products by 2013). It may transpire that, as in the case of round-
tripping “FDI” from Hong Kong to China, it will be Chinese firms operating in 
SSA who take advantage of these trade preferences rather than SSA owned 
firms. Moreover, as we have seen, insofar as SSA commodity producers have 
exported into China, this has involved a weakening of labour and 
environmental standards, with complex distributional implications (including 
the pattern of distribution over time, as is particularly the case with 
                                            
12
  For example, as Gu (2009@) observes, the presence of many Chinese registered 
SMEs in SSA arises in large part from intense competition in the Chinese market. 
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environmental externalities where short-term employment gains are 
accompanied by long-term social costs). 
 
Fourth, and this is a case of a relatively unambiguous boost to growth-
inclusivity in SSA, new technologies are emerging from China which provide 
the potential for a growth path making use of profit-generating appropriate 
technologies. These will increase employment and provide the potential for 
smaller scale and distributed production. 
 
Fifth, the evolution of SSA growth-paths is a function their political character. 
Class is an important part of this story, and as Mohan et al show (op. cit, 
2011), in many respects class interests between Chinese and Nigerian 
workers and the Chinese and Nigerian managerial elite are becoming more 
important as a determinant of social interaction than ethnicity. Here we can 
point to two countervailing tendencies. On the one hand China’s growing 
presence in SSA provides a boost to petty-bourgeois capital, arising in part by 
the technologies made available to promote indigenous SMEs and by the 
growing presence of Chinese-owned and operated small scale firms and 
farms. On the other hand, and particularly in the hard and energy 
commodities sectors and in the large scale infrastructure and building sectors, 
China’s presence reinforces the power of big capital and parasitic state-origin 
rentiers both in SSA itself and in China. The central lesson which we draw 
from this is that the questions of inclusivity and distribution and more complex 
than they seem. It depends on the “who” in both China and SSA, the context, 
the sector and the time. Thus, seeing the issue as one of “China-as-threat” or 
“China-as-opportunity” is neither adequately nuanced nor analytically helpful.  
 
But why should we expect anything else…? 
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